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involves renewing our understanding of membership and participation
within and beyond the nation-state. Allegiance can be used to define a
singular national identity and common connection to a nation-state. In a
global context, however, we need more dynamic conceptions to understand
others outside borders. Understanding how allegiance and identity are
being reconfigured today provides valuable insights into important
contemporary debates around citizenship.
“This book reveals how public and international law understand allegiance
Rosser.9781108475730. PPC. C M Y K

and identity. Each involves viewing the nation-state as fundamental to
concepts of allegiance and identity, but they also see the world slightly
differently. With contributions from philosophers, political scientists and
social psychologists, the result is a thorough appraisal of allegiance and
identity in a range of socio-legal contexts.”
James T. Smith, New York Literary Review

Thomas Paine and the Idea of Human Rights

the importance of maintaining diversity and building allegiance with
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Interrogating the concepts of allegiance and identity in a globalised world
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holes in the safety net
While the United States continues to recover from the 2008 Great Recession, the country
still faces unprecedented inequality as increasing numbers of poor families struggle to get
by with little assistance from the government. Holes in the Safety Net: Federalism and
Poverty offers a grounded look at how states and the federal government provide
assistance to poor people. With chapters covering everything from welfare reform to
recent efforts by states to impose work requirements on Medicaid recipients, the book
avoids unnecessary jargon and instead focuses on how programs operate in practice. This
timely work should be read by anyone who cares about poverty, rising inequality, and the
relationship between state, local, and federal levels of government.
Ezra Rosser is a law professor at American University Washington College of Law, where
he teaches poverty law, property law, and federal Indian law. He is a co-author of the
leading poverty law textbook and is the editor of the Poverty Law Blog.
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1
Federalism, Entitlement, and Punishment across the
US Social Welfare State
Wendy Bach

The agency encourages “meritorious innovations that build on the human dignity that comes
with training, employment and independence.”
Tom Price, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and
Seema Verma, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

In the 2018 letter1 quoted in the preceding text, the Trump administration
announced that it was open to proposals to include work requirements and other
changes in state Medicaid programs. These proposals came in the form of administrative waiver requests that would allow particular states the ﬂexibility to change the
rules of Medicaid eligibility in their state. They were seeking permission to condition the receipt of Medicaid on compliance with work requirements and to “align”
the Medicaid program with programs like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF). The Obama administration had consistently rejected such requests on the
grounds that work requirements did not further the aims of the Medicaid program,
but the Trump administration felt no such qualms, likening Medicaid to TANF
(colloquially welfare) and arguing that, just like welfare recipients, Medicaid recipients needed to be incentivized to work to “build” their dignity. This contest, like
many others in the ﬁeld of social welfare policy, plays out on the terrain of
federalism. It is, on the surface, a battle over control among levels of government
and over the appropriate rules and structures for particular programs. But, this
chapter argues that these controversies over legal structures, legal rules, and the
location of governance, are better understood as arguments about both
deservingness and control played out through controversies about administrative
structure. In short, programs are called “welfare,” or are urged by some to be more
1

Letter from Tom Price, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Seema Verma, Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to state governors regarding their
openness to innovation in the Medicaid Program (Mar. 14, 2017), www.hhs.gov/sites/default/
ﬁles/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf.

21
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like “welfare,” when what is really meant is that we wish to use the administrative
mechanisms of federalism to control, stigmatize, punish, and deter recipients. In
contrast, when we perceive recipients as entitled, these mechanisms fall away to be
replaced by purely federally controlled, far less visible, and far more inviting
administrative structures. To make this process visible, this chapter describes the
administrative tools of beneﬁt programs as well as the corresponding cultural
assumptions tied to each program and then contextualizes a debate like the one
over Medicaid work rules using this context.
To begin, it is crucial to provide a brief theoretical background, to situate
conversations about US poverty programs within a larger frame of social support
across socioeconomic class, and to challenge some basic and common assumptions
about who does and does not receive beneﬁts. This chapter begins with that
theoretical framework, proceeds to a (re)description of the US social welfare state
to include not only poverty-based programs but also signiﬁcant support programs
targeted at those of substantial wealth. The chapter then demonstrates that the
administrative structures of US social welfare provisions operate on a continuum
from highly stigmatizing and restrictive mechanisms for the poor to nearly invisible
entitlement structures for the wealthy.2 The chapter then returns to the preceding
example and to the argument that these contests over rules and structure are best
understood as arguments about deservingness being played out through deceptively
neutral-seeming rhetoric and on the terrain of federalism and administrative law.
The chapter concludes by arguing that advocates must do more than just respond to
these arguments on their face (by demonstrating, for example, that the vast majority
of Medicaid recipients already work). In addition, advocates must counter these
moral arguments by laying bare the privileging and subordinating assumptions and
mechanisms on which they are built. They must assert that, contrary to the assumptions embedded in these arguments, those in poverty, like those of means, are not
people in need of our help to acquire dignity but are instead people, deserving of
dignity, who should be treated accordingly.

critical theory and social support
Critical scholarship plays a key role in describing the state’s role in perpetuating and
exacerbating the vast economic inequality that characterizes US society. Scholarship
focused on these issues identiﬁes ways that the state plays a role in subordinating
those at the bottom and facilitating the privilege of those at the top. Not only do
these analyses reveal the way that structures operate but they also reveal that
arguments about legal rules (for example whether beneﬁt programs should drug
2

This chapter is based on a more detailed presentation of these arguments in Wendy A. Bach,
Poor Support/Rich Support: (Re)Viewing the American Social Welfare State, 20 Fl. Tax. Rev
495 (2017) [hereinafter Bach, Poor Support/Rich Support]. Several brief passages within the
chapter are taken from that text without inserting quotation marks.
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test applicants) – though presented as justiﬁed by seemingly neutral and benign
ideas – are in fact deeply embedded in cultural constructs about the worthiness of
those with and without economic and racial privilege.
Turning ﬁrst to structurally supported subordination, a wide variety of scholars
have described the way that poverty-focused support programs stigmatize, control,
and punish the poor. In short, while programs like TANF and public housing do
provide some support, they do so at a tremendously high cost. These mechanisms
can be understood as part of what I have previously called the hyperregulatory state –
a set of “mechanisms of social support [that] are targeted, by race, class, gender
and place, to exert punitive social control over [disproportionately] poor, AfricanAmerican women, their families and their communities.”3 So, for example, conditioning welfare on drug testing both conveys the (incorrect) assumption that
the poor are more likely to use drugs and exposes women to a heightened of risk
of child welfare intervention. Similarly, Kaaryn Gustafson’s work on the
criminalization of welfare shows that programs are administered in similarly to
criminal processing;4 Dorothy Roberts’ scholarship shows the ways in which structures of support subordinate poor, African American women;5 and Priscilla Ocen’s
work highlights how community decisions to “police” Section 8 families terrorizes
those poor families who had the temerity to relocate into predominantly white
suburbia.6
Scholars have also laid bare how administrative structures and practices both arise
from, and reinforce, deeply held social beliefs about the worthiness of poor families.
Scholars like Michele Gilman7 and Ann Cammett,8 highlight the powerful role that
racially coded cultural imagery of welfare has played in justifying intrusive and
punitive policies aimed at poverty-based support programs. More recently, Khiara
Bridges’s The Poverty of Privacy Rights provides detailed and persuasive evidence
that the intrusive policies that characterize welfare programs, as well as the constitutional doctrines that consistently fail to protect women from these intrusions, are
grounded in cultural beliefs that poor women are fundamentally unworthy of
privacy and the dignity it supports.9

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25 Yale J. L.
& Feminism 319 (2014).
Kaaryn S. Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance and the Criminalization
of Poverty 1 (2011).
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474 (2012).
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare and the Policing of
Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1540 (2012).
Michele Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 Am. U. J. Gender & Soc. Pol’y & L.
247(2014).
Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads and Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34
B.C. J. L. & Soc. Just. 233 (2014).
Khiara M. Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights (2017).
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The focus on the way poverty programs reinforce subordination is complemented
by another body of critical scholarship focused on those with economic privilege.
Our beneﬁt structures do not simply subordinate those in poverty, they also reinforce
the privilege of those at the top. Martha McClusky’s scholarship on the rhetoric of
neoliberalism and welfare programs is emblematic of this work. As she explains,
“[N]eoliberalism embraces a racialized, genderized, and class-biased vision of social
equity and community solidarity that favors the interests of the most privileged
members of society.”10 The state favors those interests by actively enabling the
interests of privileged actors through the seemingly neutral concepts of efﬁciency
and moral hazard. McClusky unmasks the central efﬁciency arguments of neoliberalism by asking a crucial question: efﬁcient for whom? She then encourages
those who defend welfare to broaden their arguments:
[D]efenders of welfare should challenge the double standard underlying the neoliberal double bind, and the hierarchical vision of citizenship it both obscures and
promotes. This double standard identiﬁes some people’s interests in increasing their
share of the pie as part of an efﬁcient and naturalized market that beneﬁts the
public, while others’ interests in increasing their share of the pie are instead labeled
redistributive, and therefore potentially harmful to the public well-being.11

As McClusky demonstrates, the idea that the provision of social welfare to the
poor is “inefﬁcient” and results in “moral hazard” is entirely dependent on whose
interests are centered. If the central good being promoted is participation in the lowwage labor market, then the provision of welfare is inefﬁcient. Welfare is both
inefﬁcient and creates a moral hazard by enabling and perhaps incentivizing recipients to stay out of the market. But if one redeﬁnes the social goal as promoting a
society in which jobs provide a living wage, welfare starts to look different. By
providing economic support, welfare is efﬁcient and creates a moral beneﬁt by
strengthening the bargaining position of poor workers and incentivizing employers
to provide a living wage. Turning to another example, McClusky contrasts the
societal approbation for welfare with support for tax cuts for the wealthy. McClusky
argues that these are moral rather than economic judgments. “By identifying welfare
recipients’ gains as inefﬁcient moral hazard and tax cuts for the wealthy as promoting an efﬁcient market, [scholars] implicitly [afﬁrm] a citizenship vision in which
the poor have subordinate moral status.”12 McClusky’s analysis also suggests that,
rather than continuing to look solely at state structures that function to subordinate,
we also need to look at the structures that elevate or sustain privilege. Heeding
McClusky’s call, the following section turns to this wider view of the US social
welfare state.
10

11
12

Martha McClusky, Efﬁciency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on
the Welfare State, 78 Ind. L. J. 783, 785 (2003).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 832.
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the us social welfare state: larger and less progressive
than you might think
Since at least the 1970s, a variety of scholars have sought to redeﬁne the US social
welfare state to include not only traditional beneﬁt programs but also a variety of tax
beneﬁts that are “hidden”13 or “submerged”14 forms of “Welfare for the Wealthy.”15
Including these beneﬁts in the overall picture of US social welfare reveals a system
that is larger in size than popularly believed and that distributes signiﬁcant beneﬁts
regressively, to households with substantial wealth.
In popular culture, the beneﬁts we collectively think about as “welfare” are means
tested and heavily stigmatized. TANF (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, or AFDC), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP,
formerly food stamps), and public housing dominate the national conversation
about poverty and social welfare provision. However, these programs ﬁt but one of
the three distinct categories of social welfare provision that comprise the US welfare
state. The categories, for the purposes of this chapter, are (1) means-tested, nontaxbased beneﬁts that individuals receive if they fall below a particular income threshold; (2) social insurance beneﬁts for retirees, their spouses, and dependents, as well
as for some disabled individuals; and (3) beneﬁts – like tax expenditures, students
loans, and parts of Medicare – that ﬂow largely invisibly to individuals and families
through the tax code and other support programs.
Although means-tested beneﬁts and social insurance are the most visible forms of
cash and near-cash assistance, the United States also dispenses signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
assistance to individuals and families in other ways. These beneﬁts have been
described by Suzanne Mettler as beneﬁts within the “Submerged State.”16 Mettler
contrasts visible beneﬁts, which include both social insurance and means-tested
beneﬁts, with other beneﬁts structured to be signiﬁcantly less visible. According to
Mettler, “The ‘submerged state’ includes a conglomeration of federal policies that
function by providing incentives, subsidies, or payment to private organizations or
households to encourage or reimburse them for conducting activities deemed to
serve a public purpose.”17
Chief among submerged state programs are tax provisions that simultaneously
reduce tax collection and meet social welfare objectives. Often referred to as tax
expenditures, these provisions are tax rules that are functionally identical to social

13

14

15

16
17

Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social
Policy in the United States 3 (1997).
Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies
Undermine American Democracy 16–17 (2011).
Christopher G. Faricy, Welfare for the Wealthy: Parties, Social Spending and
Inequality in the United States (2015).
Mettler, supra note 14, at 4.
Id. at 4.
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welfare spending programs in that they provide a ﬁnancial beneﬁt and “promote
some socially desirable objective.”18 As explained by the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce, “Both tax expenditures and spending programs provide ﬁnancial assistance
for particular activities, entities, or groups of people. Through that assistance, tax
expenditures and spending programs alter people’s behavior, change the allocation
of resources in the economy, and transfer income among households.”19
The argument that legal rules, colloquially known as “tax breaks,” are functionally
equivalent to a welfare payment is counterintuitive. Tax breaks, so the argument
goes, allow a taxpayer to “keep their own money” whereas welfare is a “handout.”
But from a budgetary perspective, the two are identical. Both result in a net
reduction in revenue to the state and a net cash beneﬁt to the taxpayer. As Christopher Howard explains:
[W]ith tax expenditures, the government is essentially collecting what taxpayers
would owe under a “pure” tax system and simultaneously cutting some taxpayers a
check for behaving in certain desired ways, such as buying a home. In a pure
system, everyone with the same income would pay the same amount of income tax.
In the real world, people with the same income often do not pay the same tax,
because some are able to take advantage of tax expenditures while others are not.20

When one takes this wider view of the US social welfare state, the extent of
spending appears quite different. In 2018, the US government is projected to spend
approximately $560 billion on the largest cash and near-cash beneﬁt programs for
housing, food, cash assistance, medical care, and child care.21 The United States will
spend approximately $1.67 trillion on social insurance ($615 billion on Medicare
and $1.052 trillion on old age and disability insurance).22 Finally in 2013,23 the
18
19

20
21

22
23

Howard, supra note 13, at 3.
Cong. Budget Office, The Distribution of Major Tax Expenditures in the Individual
Income Tax System 8 (2013).
Id.
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2016 Analytical Perspectives of the US
Government, at Table 25–12 (2017), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-PER/pdf/
BUDGET-2016-PER-9-6-2.pdf (table for “Baseline Net Budget Authority by Function,
Category, and Program”) [hereinafter Table 25–12]. This ﬁgure includes 2018 outlays (all in
millions) for Medicaid ($381,521); the Children’s Health Insurance Program ($5,700); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance ($83,536); the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants
and Children ($6,954); state child nutrition programs ($23,196); federally funded housing
programs ($45,440); Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ($17,347); Supplemental Security
Income ($56,511); the Childcare and Development Block Grant ($2,579). Id. Not included in
this number are transfer programs focusing on education and training, energy assistance,
Veteran’s beneﬁts, programs funded to provide services to low-income individuals and communities, and some smaller mean-tested programs. Also excluded, to prevent double counting,
are means-tested tax expenditures, the two most signiﬁcant of which are the EITC ($62,615)
and the CTC ($21,508).
Id.
For this calculation, despite the obvious downside of using 2013 rather than 2018 data, I have
chosen to use these ﬁgures because of complications involved in calculating the value of tax
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United States provided more than $900 billion to individuals and families through
the 10 largest tax expenditures.24 This ﬁgure represents approximately two-thirds of
overall tax expenditure spending, roughly 5.6 percent of GDP. Clearly, inclusion of
tax expenditures in the category of social welfare spending signiﬁcantly affects the
size of the US social welfare state.
Moreover, although beneﬁt provision remains progressive to a certain degree, it is
signiﬁcantly less progressive than generally assumed.25 The three categories of social
welfare programs beneﬁt very different groups in society. The majority of meanstested beneﬁts go to those in poverty; social insurance goes to nearly all with a
progressive distribution overall. In contrast, tax expenditures ﬂow primarily to those
in the top quintiles of the economic distribution. While a small percentage of the
provisions that the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce deems tax expenditures beneﬁt
those in lower-income quintiles, the vast majority beneﬁt the richest taxpayers –
those in the top 20 percent. For the 10 largest tax expenditures in 2013, which again
totaled more than $900 billion or 5.6 percent of GDP, “more than half of the
combined beneﬁts . . . accrue to households in the highest income quintile . . . with
17% going to households in the top 1 percent of the population.”26 At this point it
should be clear that social welfare programs exist and beneﬁt those across the US
income spectrum. But while this is true, what is also true is that these programs are
structured quite differently. The following section explores those differences.

24

25

26

expenditures. While one can calculate outlays for direct spending programs simply by adding
budget items, the calculation of tax expenditures is far more complicated. This is due to a
variety of important factors. First, although one can calculate the revenue lost through a
particular tax provision, this ﬁgure only represents the revenue that the state would gain if
the particular provision was repealed and there were no other effects. It therefore does not
account for behavioral and market changes that might result. So, for example, it does not
contemplate the housing market effects on a repeal of the home mortgage interest deduction,
although presumably its repeal would potentially lower market prices and/or lower the amount
that a particular family spends on a home. In addition, as explained by the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce, “the estimated magnitude of a collection of tax expenditures may differ from the
sum of the estimate magnitudes of the separate expenditures because of the interactions that
arise among expenditures.” Cong. Budget Office, supra note 19, at 9. Finally, estimations
“are measured relative to a comprehensive income tax system. If tax expenditures were
evaluated relative to an alternative tax system . . . some of the 10 major tax expenditures
[included in the CBO report] would not be considered tax expenditures.” Id.
Cong. Budget Office, supra note 19, at 1. The 10 tax expenditures included in this analysis
were exclusions for employer-sponsored health insurance, net pension contributions and
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, and a portion of Social Security and
railroad retirement beneﬁts; deductions including some taxes paid to state and local governments, mortgage interest payment and charitable contributions; and two tax credits, the EITC
and the CTC. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the relative progressivity of US social welfare spending, see
Bach, Poor Support/Rich Support, supra note 2.
Cong. Budget Office, The Distribution of Major Tax Expenditures in the Individual
Income Tax System 1 (2013).
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federalism and legal and administrative
variations across class
To lay bare the structural differences along class lines, this section focuses on two
basic areas of social support: cash assistance for households with dependent children
and health insurance. In the ﬁrst category fall three major programs: Temporary
Assistance Beneﬁts, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Child Tax
Credit (CTC). The second category includes a whole range of programs, two of
which are the focus of this discussion: Medicaid for pregnant women and the
exclusion of employer-paid health insurance premiums from taxable income. As
one moves from the bottom to the top of the income scale, programs generally
transition from joint federal and state administration to federal administration, from
low to high participation rates, from a focus on fraud to a focus on enrolling those
who are eligible, and from the presence to the absence of additional eligibility
restrictions (mechanisms to scrutinize behavior and designed to share information).
These examples clearly demonstrate that we have a wide variety of punitive or
supportive administrative mechanisms; arguments over what rules and to impose
(work requirements, for example) have everything to do with how we view the
beneﬁciaries of a particular program and the true goals we have for it.

Cash Assistance for Households with Dependent Children
The United States provides signiﬁcant income assistance to households with
dependent children. For those in poverty, TANF provides the primary beneﬁt.
For those slightly higher on the income scale, the EITC provides support and for
those both in the middle and at the top, the CTC plays this role. Before comparing
the programs, it is important to know some basic facts about each.
The TANF program was established in 1996 to replace AFDC. In terms of
income quintile, TANF serves households in the bottom quintile (the bottom ﬁfth
of the income scale). As of July 2017, families of three with no other income than
TANF beneﬁts will remain below 60 percent of the federal poverty line in every
state.27 This amounts to $12,252 in annual income. The program is authorized by
federal law but administered by states through block grant funding. Participating
states receive the block grant to meet loosely deﬁned program objectives. Restrictions in federal law focus not on ensuring that poor households are supported but
instead on banning assistance for certain categories of lawfully residing immigrants,
forcing recipients to engage in work activities, and forbidding recipients from using
certain education and training activities as a means of complying with these work
27

Ctr. for Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Policy Brief, TANF Beneﬁts Are Too Low to Help
Families Meet Basic Needs (Oct. 13, 2017), www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/
policy-brief-tanf-cash-beneﬁts-are-too-low-to-help-families-meet.
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requirements. In addition, at this point, TANF is quite small, with projected
2018 expenditures totaling just more than $17 billion.28
The EITC is a federal tax credit that can both reduce income tax liability and, in
some cases, provide a beneﬁt in excess of the tax liability.29 In contrast to TANF, it is
wholly federally administered. Like TANF, the EITC is restricted to households
with earned income.30 Thus, it does not provide any beneﬁts to those in poverty who
have not and/or cannot obtain work. Unlike the majority of tax expenditures, the
EITC is targeted to low-income households. It phases in as earned income increases
above zero and phases out as earned income/adjusted gross income increases above
set thresholds. For example, for calendar year 2018 a single parent household with
three or more qualifying children will not receive any EITC beneﬁts if adjusted
gross or earned income amounts exceed $49,194 (for a married couple ﬁling jointly
with three or more dependent children the limit is $54,884).31 These maximums are
misleading, however, because households just below these income levels receive
modest EITC beneﬁts. EITC beneﬁts begin to “phase out” or are reduced pro rata
when adjusted gross incomes reach far lower levels. So, for example, for a single
parent household with three or more children, the family will receive the maximum
EITC (in 2018 $6,431) when earned income is at least $14,290 and both adjusted
gross income and earned income are less than $18,660 annually.32 The EITC
maximum beneﬁt of $6,431 plateaus between $14,290 and $18,660 for these families.
With higher earned and adjusted gross incomes, between $18,660 and $49,194, the
amount of the EITC phases out to zero.33 Thus the EITC provides the most beneﬁts
to lower-income households with children. The maximum childless EITC is only
$519 in 2018.34 Nevertheless, aggregate EITC beneﬁts are quite signiﬁcant in
comparison to TANF. In 2017 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) delivered $65
billion in EITC beneﬁts to 27 million workers and their families.35
The CTC is, like the EITC, a federal tax credit that focuses on the presence of
dependent children in the taxpayer’s household and, for lower-income families,
28

29
30
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Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2017 Analytical Perspectives of the U.S. Government,
at Table 25–12 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/omb/budget/
fy2017/assets/25_12.pdf.
I.R.C. § 32.
The relevant statutory provision, I.R.C. § 32, provides the credit for those with “earned
income.” Earned income includes all taxable income and wages received from working as
well as a limited number of disability beneﬁts received prior to retirement age. What Is Earned
Income?, Internal Rev. Serv. (Dec. 16, 2016) www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/
earned-income-tax-credit/earned-income.
I.R.C. § 32; Rev. Proc. 2018–18, 2018–10 I.R.B. 392.
Rev. Proc. 2018–18, 2018–10 I.R.B. 392.
Id. For married ﬁling jointly, the phase-out starts at $24,350 and ends at $54,884.
Internal Rev. Ser., Statistics for Tax Returns with EITC, www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-central/statisticsfor-tax-returns-with-eitc/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc.
Internal Rev. Ser., Statistics for Tax Returns with EITC, www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-central/statisticsfor-tax-returns-with-eitc/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc.
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requires work. As of 2018, for most families in receipt of the credit, the CTC will
provide a credit of $2,000 per child. While the CTC does play some role in
alleviating poverty, as of 2018 the credit has been changed substantially. The recent
changes double the amount of the credit from $1,000 to $2,000 (but notably only
increase the refundable portion to $1,400); require a Social Security number for
qualifying children; and signiﬁcantly increase the phase-out thresholds for eligible
households. The CTC, which previously subsidized families predominantly in the
ﬁrst three quintiles,36 will now beneﬁt families with modiﬁed adjusted gross income
up to and above $400,000, well into the top quintile of earners.37 While families
with incomes of $400,000 previously would not have received any CTC beneﬁt, as
of 2018 they will receive $2,000 per qualifying child. Many low-income families will
not similarly beneﬁt because the credit is only refundable up to $1,400 per qualifying
child and is further limited to 15 percent of earned income more than $2,500.38 As
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, explains, because of a complicated
combination of limited refundability and dependence on earned income, “[t]en
million children under age 17 in low-income working families will receive nothing
or a token increase of $75 or less from the law’s CTC expansion. Another 14 million
children will get more than $75 but less than the full $1,000-per-child increase that
families with higher incomes will receive.”39
These three programs vary administratively in crucial ways. As noted in the
preceding text, only TANF has joint state and federal administration. In fact, the
block grant nature of the program has resulted in a degree of state discretion far
broader than even other beneﬁt programs that target the poor. As Michele Gilman
makes clear in her chapter in this volume, this form of federalism has not been good
for poor people. The other two programs, the EITC and the CTC, are entirely
federal. They are created through federal legislation and administered by the
Internal Revenue Service.
One of the primary features of beneﬁts at the bottom is the failure of these
programs to reach all those who are income eligible. TANF is particularly egregious
in this respect. In 1996, when the program was created, TANF served 68 percent of
families with children in poverty. But over the last two decades this has fallen
precipitously. In 2017, TANF served only 23 percent of those families.40 This decline
is due in large part to the use of restrictive eligibility rules and processes.41 Moving
slightly up the income scale, the EITC is far more effective, reaching 79 percent of
36
37
38
39
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Rev. Proc. 2018–18, 2018–10 I.R.B. 392.
Id.
I.R.C. § 24.
New Tax Law Tilted to the Wealthy and Corporations (Apr. 9, 2018), www.cbpp.org/research/
federal-tax/new-tax-law-tilted-toward-wealthy-and-corporations.
Ctr. for Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Policy Brief, TANF Reaching Very Few Poor Families
(Dec. 13, 2017), www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/policy-brief-tanf-reaching-fewpoor-families.
Id.
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eligible households.42 Finally, while there is no available data clearly indicating
participation rates for the CTC, it is fairly easy to claim on tax returns and likely has
participation rates as high or higher than the EITC.
Variability in participation rates seems to arise from several factors including the
deﬁnition of error used by the administering agency, the resources spent on policing
error, and the application and participation rules. When discussing error rates in
public assistance programs, programs diverge not on whether they are concerned
with errors but on the kinds of error they are trying to avert.
Driven by the imagery of extensive “welfare fraud,” agencies administering TANF
focus on preventing fraud and punishing those who engage in fraud. In contrast, in
more favored beneﬁt programs, the emphasis is not on fraud but on ensuring receipt
by eligible households. To accomplish these ends, agencies use diametrically
opposed eligibility and error detection processes. For TANF and similar beneﬁts,
one must prove eligibility prior to receipt, not only by establishing income and
resource eligibility, but also by complying with a wide swath of pre-receipt requirements. In general, no beneﬁts are received until all requirements are met and any
failure to comply (by, for example, missing one of many appointments or failing to
provide documentation) can result in rejection of the application. In addition, a
household found to have committed fraud faces swift and harsh punishment. In
New York, for example, intentional program violations can result in denial of
beneﬁts for up to ﬁve years as well as a misdemeanor prosecution.
Tax beneﬁts are administered quite differently. When applying for the EITC or
the CTC, you simply assert eligibility by checking a box or ﬁlling out a form.
Beneﬁts are provided on the basis of that assertion. Other errors are pursued through
the audit process after receipt. But even within the IRS, one can trace differences in
the pursuit of fraud in the EITC versus other tax provisions. While it is true that the
EITC is similar to other tax provisions in the use of the postreceipt audit process, the
IRS has consistently pursued error in the EITC program more aggressively than
other arguably more lucrative errors. While there is no question that the EITC
erroneous payment rate is signiﬁcant, “with estimates ranging from the low to high
20% range” of returns claiming the EITC,43 there is also no question that the audit
rates for the EITC are very high. As Susannah Tahk explains, “[C]laiming the EITC
doubles a taxpayer’s chances of an audit.”44 The rationale for dedicating IRS
resources to these errors, over potentially more signiﬁcant sources of revenue
collection, is unclear. As Nina Olsen, the National Taxpayer Advocate, points out,
the cost of EITC errors is dwarfed by the cost of error in other portions of the tax
code. Citing IRS data, she notes that, “EITC overclaims account for just seven
42

43
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Natalie Holmes & Alan Berube, The Brookings Institute, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and Community Economic Stability (Nov. 20, 2015), www.brookings.edu/articles/the-earnedincome-tax-credit-and-community-economic-stability/.
Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1173, 1193–94 (2013).
Susannah Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 791, 844–45 (2014).
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percent of gross individual income tax compliance, while business income underreported by individuals accounts for $51.9%,” or $122 billion in lost revenue.45
Similarly, the US Government Accountability Ofﬁce has noted, that the focus on
the EITC is misplaced given the far larger sources of revenue potentially available if
audit and collection resources were directed toward other sources of error.46 Finally,
pursuing tax errors by higher-income households also yields signiﬁcantly higher
revenues. As Francine Lipman points out, “While less than one-quarter as many
examinations were conducted of tax returns with income from $200,000 to $1
million, those examinations generated more tax revenue than examinations of EITC
ﬁlers.”47 In light of such data, it is fair to suggest that the dedication of IRS resources
to the EITC, over other sources of error, represents at least in part, value judgments
on the moral status of different taxpayers.
The EITC, like TANF, is characterized by severe sanctions. Taxpayers
who fraudulently claim the EITC cannot receive EITC beneﬁts for 10 years.48
Because the EITC depends on the presence of qualifying children in a taxpayer’s
household, the 10-year ban may effectively be a lifetime ban for a family.49 A claim
made with “reckless or intentional disregard of rules” results in a two-year ban.50
Although beginning in 2016 parallel sanctions applied to the CTC,51 sanctions like
this are virtually unheard of in the tax code. In fact, “[t]here are no analogous
sanctions applicable to other improper positions taken on federal income tax
returns.”52
Moving to other aspects of administration reveals additional signiﬁcant differences along the income scale. In a clear feature of beneﬁts at the bottom, applying
for and receiving TANF exposes recipients to scrutiny, punitive rules, and signiﬁcant
risk of exposure to additional punishment. Applying for TANF involves a series of
face-to-face appointments with various agency personnel. During the application
process, applicants are required to disclose a wide range of personal information and
45
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The National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 25 & n. 83
(2015) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate).
US Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13–151, Tax Gap: IRS Could Significantly
Increase Revenues by Better Targeting Enforcement Resources 8 (2012) (“[E]xams
(both correspondence and ﬁeld) of taxpayers with positive incomes of at least $200,000
produced signiﬁcantly more direct revenue per dollar of cost than exams of lower income
taxpayers.”).
Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1173, 1193–94 (2013).
I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i). A similar rule was added to the CTC by the Protecting Americans from
Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), Pub. L. No. 114–113, Div. Q, § 208(a)(1), 129 Stat. 3040, 3083
(codiﬁed at I.R.C. § 24(g)).
I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(3), 152(c).
I.R.C. §32(k)(1)(B)(ii). A parallel rule was added to the CTC for taxable years beginning in
2016. I.R.C. § 24(g); PATH Act, § 208(c).
PATH Act, § 208(a)–(c).
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 1867, 1894 (2005); see also Lipman, supra note 36, at 1196 (quoting Zelenak).
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are subjected to extensive information-veriﬁcation procedures. Failure to provide
this information or documentation can result in a denial of beneﬁts. Applicants do
not receive the beneﬁt by merely proving income eligibility. Instead, during the
application process and beyond, they are subject to a wide range of nonincome- and
nonasset-related criteria. Just to give a few examples, applicants are often drug tested
and or required to participate in prebeneﬁt receipt work programs. Failure to
comply with any of these requirements results in denial of the application.
The process is also deeply stigmatizing. As Kaaryn Gustafson has persuasively
demonstrated, “Welfare rules assume the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the logics
of crime control now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to ameliorate its
effects.”53 Practices like these are a large part of the reason that so many families in
poverty do not receive help.
Beneﬁts at the bottom are also characterized by rules limiting increases in beneﬁts
as families grow. Although as a general matter, TANF households receive higher
beneﬁts when there are more children present in the household, in many jurisdictions, this is not the case. Many states currently have “child exclusion” or “family
cap” policies. These policies exclude families from receiving additional assistance if
their household size increases as the result of the birth of a child. Like TANF, the
EITC has both a family cap and work requirements. Prior to 1996, a family’s AFDC
beneﬁt was determined by, among other factors, the size of the household.54 Each
child in the household added a very small additional amount to the family’s AFDC
allotment. After 1996, with repeal of AFDC and enactment of TANF, states were no
longer required to provide additional beneﬁts when the household size increased.55
Since then, many states have implemented caps on budget size that do not rise upon
the arrival of additional household members.56
Another central feature of TANF is its unrelenting emphasis on work. Although
state and local programs had been experimenting with work programs before 1996,
the TANF program instituted an aggressive national set of work requirements,
requiring nearly every adult on welfare to engage in signiﬁcant work activities and
53
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Gustafson, supra note 4, at 1.
Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging
Consequences, 29 Harv. J. L. & Gender 151, 152–53 (2006) (noting that under AFDC, “states
were required to obtain waivers from the federal government to implement policies such as
family caps because they violated the Social Security Act by incorporating eligibility criteria
based on behavior”).
Id. at 153–54 (“The ﬁnal version of TANF . . . did not require states to implement caps, but
instead, by remaining silent, allowed states to continue utilizing existing family cap policies or
enact new caps without federal oversight.”). In fact, states were not even required to have
individual beneﬁt programs. They were merely required, as a condition of receipt of federal
TANF funds, to institute programs that met the overall purposes of the federal program.
Despite this latitude in federal law, all states retained some kind of cash or cash-equivalent
beneﬁt program for households with dependent children.
See Erika Huber et al., Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2014: OPRE
Report 2015–81, at 238–39 (2015) (Table L10: Family Cap Policies, 1996–2014).
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allowing states to mete out harsh penalties for the failure to comply with these
requirements.57 While there is very little evidence to suggest that these programs
successfully linked TANF recipients to employment that would lift their families out
of poverty, there is extensive evidence that work requirements, like other
nonincome-related program criteria, resulted in widespread application denials
and case closings.
Like TANF, the federal EITC contains both a family cap and a work requirement. Although the EITC increases for households with between zero and three
children, it is capped at that point. Like the TANF family cap, the maximum beneﬁt
is provided to households with three “or more” children.58 Also like TANF, the
EITC contains a work requirement. One can only receive the EITC if one receives
work income. Families receiving equivalent incomes from other sources – for
example, Social Security Disability – are not eligible for the beneﬁt. As discussed
in the following text and as noted by Dorothy Brown,59 these features are not present
in the CTC, a tax expenditure program that beneﬁts higher-income families.
Finally, applying for and participating in TANF exposes applicants to severe
potential consequences. Consider Florida’s drug-testing law. When implementing
that law, the Florida Department of Children and Families instituted procedures
that included the sharing of positive drug tests with the Florida Abuse Hotline. As
described by the District Court in its decision enjoining the Florida program:
DCF shares all positive drug tests for controlled substances with the Florida Abuse
Hotline. . .. After receiving a positive drug test, a hotline counselor enters a Parent
Needs Assistance referral into a child welfare database known as the Florida Safe
Families Network. . .. [A] referral is then prepared . . . so that “other appropriate
response to the referral in the particular county of residence of the applicant” may
be taken. . .. [T]he statute governing the Florida Abuse Hotline authorizes the
disclosure of records from the abuse hotline to “[c]riminal justice agencies of
appropriate jurisdiction,” as well as “[t]he state attorney of the judicial circuit in
which the child resides or in which the alleged abuse or neglect occurred.” Law
enforcement ofﬁcials may access the Florida Safe Families Network and make such
use of the data as they see ﬁt.60
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42 U.S.C. § 607 (2017) (last amended 2012); see also Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104–193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2129 (1996).
I.R.C. § 32(b)(1).
Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 Emory L. J. 755,
757–58 (2005).
Compl. at 10, Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 6:11 Civ. 01473)
(stating that applicants are required to sign a “Drug Testing Information Acknowledgement
and Consent Release,” which includes, among other provisions, that applicants consent that
information on a failed test will be shared with the Florida Abuse Hotline “for review to initiate
an assessment or an offer of services.”).
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Moreover, in many cases, these punitive harms associated with information
sharing across agencies are imposed disproportionately on African American women
and their children.61
Health Insurance
The US system of health insurance includes, of course, a wide range of publicly
supported programs including Medicare, Medicaid, programs created and funded
through the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and various tax expenditures. This
section focuses on two pieces of this puzzle: Medicaid for pregnant women as it is
administered in one state and the tax exclusion for employer-provided health
insurance.
New York’s Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) is funded through the
state’s Medicaid program. Like many other poverty-targeted programs, Medicaid for
pregnant mothers is enabled through federal law, jointly administered by federal and
state agencies, and paid for through a combination of federal and state funds. This
arrangement allows for signiﬁcant ﬂexibility for the states. For example, states have
signiﬁcant discretion in choosing the population of those covered, and states
vary widely in the choices they make. So Oklahoma and South Dakota cover
pregnant women up to 133 percent of the poverty line62 while New York
covers pregnant women up to 218 percent of the poverty line.63 States also have
considerable discretion in structuring their application process.64
Contrary to popular perception, even before the ACA, Medicaid and Medicare
were not the only signiﬁcant means through which the United States provided
families with economic support for health insurance. In fact, the United States
provides extensive economic support to individuals who receive their health insurance through their employers. This beneﬁt comes in the form of the largest US tax
expenditure: the exclusion of employer contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term care insurance. The way this works is fairly simple.
Generally, when employers provide economic beneﬁts to workers, those beneﬁts
must be included as earned income. Under this tax provision, employer-provided
health care coverage is excluded from taxable income. So, even though the
employer is providing something with economic value, that income transfer is not
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These arguments are presented in signiﬁcantly more detail in Bach, The Hyperregulatory State,
supra note 3.
Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid and Chip Eligibility Levels, www
.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-eligibility-levels/index
.html#footnote4.
Id.
Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121 (2000) (noting, in part, the ways in which
discretion has shifted to states to manipulate the culture and organization of welfare ofﬁces).
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taxed, resulting in a net transfer of income from the federal government to the
individual. In 2018, these beneﬁts will confer almost $228 billion in economic
support to these households of employed individuals.65
While Medicaid traditionally focused on families in the lower-income quintiles,
the tax exclusion of employer contributions for health care beneﬁts higher-income
families at higher rates as you move up the income scale. This is due to two primary
factors: the type of employers that offer employer-sponsored health insurance
and the way that tax brackets affect the value of the beneﬁt. First, employers at
the low end of the economy are simply far less likely to offer health insurance.
Second, because income tax rates are progressive, that is they are higher as taxable
income increases, the value of an exclusion raises as your income raises. As
explained by the Tax Policy Center at the Brookings Institution, this beneﬁt “is
worth more to the higher-income families who would be more likely to purchase
insurance in the ﬁrst place. In 2015, less than 30 percent of families in the bottom
income quintile were offered [employer-sponsored insurance, or ESI]; for them, the
average beneﬁt of the ESI exclusion was less than $10. In contrast, nearly 90 percent
of families in the top quintile have ESI offers and the average beneﬁt is almost
$3,200.”66
Like many other beneﬁts at the bottom, the PCAP program is characterized by
highly intrusive administrative structures. Khiara Bridges’s ethnographic study of the
PCAP program provides a detailed description of these requirements.67 As she
documents, a PCAP client must provide extensive personal information to a wide
variety of professionals about subjects ranging from her diet, income, history with
child-welfare agencies, immigration status, mental health history, relationship history, any history of violence, use of contraception, and parenting plans – all well
before she has access to this support. In a striking example of how this plays out,
Bridges describes an invasive interview that took place as a part of one woman’s
application for prenatal assistance:
What is remarkable about this exchange is that Erica was led into a conversation
about a romantic relationship that tragically involved severe, homelessnessinducing violence, the healthiness of her relationship with the father of her
children, her earnings capacity, the earnings capacity of the father of her children,
and any previous contact that she had had with the welfare state (in addition to
answering questions about her history, if any, with tobacco and alcohol products,
controlled substances, mental illness, and a host of other issues that I have not
65
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U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Table 3 (Oct. 16, 2017), www.treasury
.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2019.pdf (estimating the beneﬁt at $227.880 billion for 2018 and $242.880 billion for 2019).
Tax Policy Center Brieﬁng Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, www.taxpolicycenter
.org/brieﬁng-book/how-does-employer-sponsored-insurance-exclusion-affect-health-insurancecoverage.
Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 Harv. J. L. & Gender 113 (2011).
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included in this excerpted portion of the interview) because she was pregnant and
had presented herself to a public hospital with the hope of receiving state-assisted
prenatal care.68

Through these mechanisms, “[P]oor women’s private lives are made available for
state surveillance . . . and they are exposed to the possibility of punitive state
responses.” 69
The contrast between this application process and the administrative mechanisms
of the employer-provided health cost exclusion is stark. The exclusion is “applied
for,” in the broadest sense, not by the employee who beneﬁts but by the employer
who ﬁlls out the forms. They are invisible to the beneﬁciaries. There are no invasive
questions, no more hurdles, and no possibility of further punitive intervention.
Instead there is only ﬁnancial support.

visibility, invisibility, and entitlement
Clearly, the United States provides government beneﬁts to individuals along the
entire income spectrum. This chapter has highlighted this phenomenon in the
realms of cash assistance to households with dependent children and health insurance, but the observation holds true across the US social welfare state. While
beneﬁts for the poor are visible, stigmatizing, and punitive, beneﬁts for those with
means are largely invisible. This invisibility is embedded in the structure of those
programs. As Suzanne Mettler explains, the “[H]allmark [of submerged state beneﬁts] is the way they obscure government’s role from the view of the general public,
including those who number among their beneﬁciaries. Even when people stare
directly at these policies, many perceive a freely functioning market system at
work.”70
If one accepts the premise that these are all social welfare beneﬁts, given by the
state to individuals for similar needs (medical care or support of dependent children), then the differences in administration cannot have anything to do with the
best or the most efﬁcient administrative mechanism to provide support for dependent children or for health care. Instead, it must have something to do with the
recipients. The message is clear: beneﬁts for the nonpoor are not a handout.
Recipients of beneﬁts like the CTC and the health insurance premium exemption
are entitled to those beneﬁts. There is nothing wrong with these beneﬁciaries and
nothing we need to change about them connected to receipt of the beneﬁt. Unlike
the women applying for PCAP, there is no need to ask about their life circumstances, relationships, or plans. For the PCAP recipient, we seem to assume that she
needs more than just the prenatal care that she is seeking. Perhaps she has a problem
68
69
70

Id. at 116.
Id. at 131.
Mettler, supra note 10, at 5.
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with her relationships or her ﬁnances. Read in the most generous light, the invasive
questions indicate a desire to help with the problems that we assume she has. Read
less generously, and perhaps more accurately, we mean instead to shame and deter
her. If this is generosity, it is at best generosity inextricable from bias. What is crucial
is that we assume she has those problems and is in need of help when we make no
such assumptions for recipients of the CTC or the health insurance premium
exemption. Unlike the poor and stereotypically black recipients of PCAP or TANF,
recipients of those tax beneﬁts are not dependent and therefore do not need to be
taught independence. They are not likely drug users. They are not likely frauds.
They are not likely criminals. But that is not the case for our image of the poor.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of support for the poor goes to white families,
our image remains that of the welfare queen. It is only if one accepts these
assumptions that the structural differences highlighted in this chapter make sense.

medicaid waiver requests
In 2017, the Trump administration, while failing to lead their party to the repeal of
the ACA, turned some of its energy to wielding an administrative mechanism to
make signiﬁcant changes to the Medicaid program. The administration used a
provision in federal law allowing them to grant waiver requests (called 1115 waivers)
to states to do demonstration projects that test new approaches to meeting programmatic aims. Several states proposed changes that sought to align the Medicaid
program more closely, as a matter of administration, with programs like TANF
and SNAP. States sought waivers to include work requirements, drug screening, and
eligibility time limits on the program, all hallmarks of the 1996 welfare reform.
While similar requests had been pending for some time with the Department of
Health and Human Service’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
a letter from Tom Price and Seema Verma, quoted at the opening of this chapter,
gave signiﬁcant cause for hope to those states seeking these waivers. At the start of the
letter, Price and Verma provided their justiﬁcation for this new willingness to
consider waiver requests, “The expansion of Medicaid through the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) to non-disabled, working age adults without dependent children was a
clear departure from the core, historical mission of the program.” The ACA – which
provided, for the ﬁrst time, Medicaid coverage for individuals below 133 percent of
the poverty level who were not pregnant, disabled, or the parent or caretaker of a
dependent child – had changed the rules of the game. For Price and Verma, these
recipients were not the “truly vulnerable.” Instead, their presence called, by this line
of thinking, for a different kind of Medicaid program. The letter went on to
encourage states to experiment with work requirements that would “build on the
human dignity that comes with training, employment and independence.” What is
interesting about this framing is the focus on dignity. Although states have certainly
sought waivers not just for this population, these new recipients lacked human
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dignity; to obtain it, they needed a set of administrative rules that provide human
dignity for them. The stereotype that poor Medicaid recipients are people not
worthy of being treated as already possessing dignity justiﬁed the policy.
Several months later, in a letter to State Medicaid Directors from CMS, the
agency counseled states that, in implementing work requirements, “CMS supports
states’ efforts to align SNAP or TANF work or work-related requirements with the
Medicaid program as a part of a demonstration authorized under section 1115.”71
While there is an ostensibly benign reason for this suggestion (an individual receiving multiple beneﬁts should be subject to just one uniform work requirement),
another clear message comes through. The attempt embodied in the ACA to create
an entitlement to health care for all, including nondisabled poor individuals without
dependents, sent the wrong message. Work requirements, like drug testing, and time
limits are hallmarks of beneﬁts for the poor and are heavily racially coded. They
assume that the poor, unlike the wealthy, are in need of behavioral control. They
assume that poor people are in need of our teaching. And we know this because we
have other administrative mechanisms at our disposal that we choose not to use.
When we provide the CTC or the exemption for health care expenses or a whole list
of other beneﬁts for the wealthy, nothing about how we provide those beneﬁts
suggests the same set of assumptions. Instead, we signal through our means of
administration that wealthy recipients are worthy and entitled to beneﬁts.

conclusion
At the end of the day as advocates, we must continue to make arguments on the
merits that respond to proposals presented by those who deem the poor unworthy. In
the Medicaid example, we must continue to demonstrate that the vast majority of
Medicaid recipients already work and that – if the TANF experience is a guide – the
impact of these changes will not be to transition families to work that sustains their
families, but instead will simply diminish the number of those in receipt of the
beneﬁt. Beyond this, we cannot stop reminding the public of two essential facts.
First, that the poor, like those of means, do not need a program to give them dignity.
What they need and deserve instead are programs that provide support and that treat
them with dignity. Second, for those who suggest that these programmatic elements
are the best or most efﬁcient way to run support programs, we must lay bare their
assumptions and remind them that we already have the tools at our disposal to treat
the poor with dignity. We do so for the rich every day.
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